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RESENTENCE WITHOUT CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED:
UNEQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
FRANK J.

O

I.

WHALEN, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

of the proudest boasts of Americans is stated in various
forms, but no more succinctly than that appearing above the

NE

entrance of the Supreme Court of the United
Justice Under Law." In

States: "Equal

recent years, there has appeared, in a

number of jurisdictions, a doctrine which blatantly violates that
notion. And it is most critical indeed that the breach has appeared
in the administration of the criminal law, an area of government
in which we have prided ourselves that progress was making its
way.
What has been done is this. Prisoners, by habeas corpus, writs
of error coram nobis, or other review procedures, have procured
the reversal of judgments under which they were sentenced long
ago. Retrial or resentencing followed, and at the time of imposing
the second sentence, the courts refused to give the defendants credit
for time served under the earlier sentence.,
The effects upon the defendants have varied. For some, the total
time served exceeded the statutory maximum for the offense involved in the ultimate conviction and judgment.2 For others, the
*Afember of District- of Columbia on Massachusetts Bars.
1. The doctrine is most prevalent in the mid-continent in contiguous
states: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin. Typical are People v.
Starks, 395 Ill. 567, 71 N. E. 2d 23 (1947), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 821
(1948) (credit for 3 years denied) ; People v. Judd, 396 Ill. 211, 71 N. E.
2d 29 (1947) (4 years) ; McDowell v. State, 225 Ind. 495, 500, 76 N. E. 2d
249, 251 (1947) (2Y years) ; it re Doelle, 323 Mich. 241, 35 N. W. 2d 251
(1948), leave to file original petition for habeas corpus denied, 336 U. S.
942 (1949) (8 years) ; it re De Meerleer, 323 Mich. 287, 35 N. W. 2d 255
(1948), cert. denied, 336 U. S. 946 (1949) (15 years) ; State ex rel. Drankovich v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 433, 439, 22 N. W. 2d 540, 543 (1946) (11 years).
See also Ex parte Wilkerson, 76 Okla. Crim. 204, 135 P. 2d 507 (1943).
2. In re Doelle, and it re De Meerleer, supra note 1.
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total time served exceeded that imposed under either sentence. 3
And for nearly all, the time required for eligibility for parole and
for realizing the benefit of credit for good prison conduct was postponed.' Pyrrhic victories resulted-men accomplishing nothing by
obtaining a fair trial and judgment at long last, except to lose their
chances for prompt release. Thus periods of men's lives amounting
to three, four, eight, eleven, and fifteen years spent in prison, were
ignored in fixing how much longer they should serve for the
very same offense.
The reasons courts have given for this treatment have varied
considerably. There is the theory that the first sentence is now
void and the state has no responsibility for the punishment the defendant has undergone. 5 And furthermore, the legislature has left
no discretion for the court to reduce the second sentence. 6 And, of
course, the defendant has himself procured the reversal of his conviction or sentence, so he has "waived" the rights under it.-

II.

THE VOID SENTENCE DOCTRINE
(A)
Origin and Development
Perhaps the most important reason is the idea of the "void
3. In People v. Starks, and People v. Judd, supra note 1, the defendants

were first sentenced to terms of one to twenty years. After serving over
three and four years respectively, they were resentenced to terms of one to
twenty years, commencing from date of resentence.
4. People v. Heard, 396 Ill. 215, 71 N. E. 2d 321 (1947) (2 years and 1
month of good conduct credit lost) ; People v. Lueckfield, 396 Ill. 520, 72
N. E. 2d 198 (1947) (defendant remanded for resentence, even though the
total of more than 7 years actually served plus nearly 3 years good conduct
credit would have exceeded the statutory maximum of 10 years) ; State
ex tel. Drankovich v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 433, 439, 22 N. W. 2d 540, 543
(1946) : ". . . petitioner is remanded . . . If he is tried on the present information he may be convicted of murder in the first degree. If so convicted
the trial court would have no discretion but to sentence him to state's prison
for life, although the prisoner has served eleven years of his sentence and
shortly will be entitled to apply for parole .... The petitioner then would
have to commence another life sentence."
5. The distinction has been based, by some courts, on whether the
sentence is void, voidable, or merely erroneous. In general, credit is denied
for the first and allowed for the last. See Notes, 12 U. of Detroit L. J. 135
(1949), and 45 Mich. L. Rev. 912 (1947).
6. This is the attitude of the Michigan and Illinois courts. See cases
cited note 1 supra.
7. The "waiver" doctrine was a device created to prevent a defendant
from claiming that a second trial, after a reversal on his own motion or appeal, constituted double jeopardy. Comley, Former Jeopardy, 35 Yale L. J.
674, 685 (1926), shows that the "waiver" doctrine crept into double jeopardy
cases through Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S.574 (1884), which involved multiple
trials after appeals by defendant, but in which no claim of double jeopardy
was asserted.
See Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S.100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) which showed convincingly that there is in fact no "waiver," but
that the double jeopardy proteetion does not extend to such a situation.

19511

RESENTENCE WITHOUT CREDIT

sentence." This has its root, it would seem, in the development of
habeas corpus as a method for reviewing criminal cases. It has a
long history, evolving from procedural limitations in the federal
courts. Consequently a brief review of the historical background is
in order.
After the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789,8 an anomalous
situation existed in our federal court system. Criminal cases from
state courts could be reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court.9 However, no review could be had anywhere of a federal
criminal case.10
In 1802, review was provided to resolve a deadlock resulting
from division of opinion among two judges in a circuit court."
Thereafter, until 1879, such certificate of division constituted the
only possible direct review of a federal criminal case. Finally in
1879, review was allowed of right in the circuit court from decisions
of district courts in criminal cases.' 2 Not until 1889 was a writ of
error from the Supreme Court allowed in a federal criminal case
and then only in capital cases.' 3 In 1891, this review was extended
to "all infamous crimes," a provision which was very broadly construed.14 The burden upon the Supreme Court became considerable; and consequently in 1897, review there was limited to capital
crimes.' 5 The appeal as of right in the Circuit Court of Appeal sufficed by 1911 to allow abolition of direct review in the Supreme
Court, save under very exceptional circumstances26
This situation caused resort to habeas corpus in federal courts,
even in the Supreme Court on original petition, as a panacea for
correction of errors in federal criminal cases. For a time, even
habeas corpus in state courts was employed.' 7 The Supreme Court
8. 1 Stat. 73, c. 20 (1789).
9. 1 Stat. 85, §25 (1789).

10. Ibid. See Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 243 et seq. (1939)

for a broad review.
11. 2 Stat. 159, c. 31, § 6 (1802).

12. 20 Stat. 354, c. 176 (1879). Review was possible in all criminal

cases in which the permissible sentence included imprisonment, or if fine
only, over $300. There was still no right of review in the Supreme Court.
13. 25 Stat. 656, c. 113 (1889).
14. 26 Stat. 826, c. 517 (1891). In Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417
(1885), it had been held that the maximum allowable punishment controlled
the determination whether a crime was infamous, within the Sixth Amendment.
15. 29 Stat. 492, c. 68 (1897). See Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 109-113 (1927).
16. Limited to questions of jurisdiction,
and treaties, and constitutional questions. 36
18 U. S. C. § 3731 (Supp. 1949).
17. 2 Warren, Supreme Court in United
Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S.487, 490 (1885)

construction of federal statutes
Stat. 1157 (1911), as amended,
States History 332 (1926) ; see
(argument for respondents).
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resisted the temptation for a long while ;18 but finally, in Ex parte
Lange, 9 it allowed habeas corpus to perform the office of review.
At the same time analogous developments were taking place in
state courts-led on by the federal courts to use habeas corpus as
a remedy for unconstitutional and illegal convictions and sentences.
Habeas corpus would lie, as the clich6 put it, only if the court
ordering the imprisonment was without jurisdiction--i.e., if the
order was "void. ' 20 Consequently the courts came to refer to the
first sentence as "void" (if it could be set aside on habeas corpus),
"voidable" or "merely erroneous" (if habeas corpus would be
denied) .21 That the first sentence was not "void" for all purposes
was clear, at least where the ground for reversal was constitutional,
for such a reversal necessitated a holding that the first sentence
was the result of governmental action.2 2 Nevertheless, the tyranny
of labels2 2 persisted, with the result that courts even went so far
18. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 82, habeas corpus would
lie in federal courts only when the petitioner was held under the authority
of the United States; in 1867, the provision was extended to allow habeas
corpus whenever the detention- violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties

of the United States, 14 Stat. 385, as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 2241 (Supp.
1949).

The earlier attitude of the Court is revealed in United States v. Gooding, 2 Wheat. 460, 467-68 (U.S. 1827). In Ex parte Gordon, 1 Black 503
(U.S. 1867), in an opinion by Chief Justice Taney, it was held that circuit
court decisions could not be reviewed in criminal cases on writs of error,
prohibition or certiorari. See Orfield, A Resume of Decisions of the United
States Supreme Court on Federal Criminal Procedure, 20 Neb. L. Rev. 251,
262-65 (1941).
19. 18 Wall. 163 (U.S. 1874). The strong dissenting opinion of Justices
Clifford and Strong was based in part upon the impropriety of expansion
of the scope of review without Congressional authorization. For a general
review of the use of federal habeas corpus, see Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 657
(1948).
20. See Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202-03 (U.S. 1830) : "An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be
an absolute nullity, and it is not a nullity if the Court has general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be erroneous."
21. E.g., Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 23 (1876); Ex parte Wilson,
114 U. S.417, 421 (1885) ; Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S.241, 253 (1886) ; Ex
parte Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176, 184 (1889) ; in re Mills, 135 U. S.263, 270

(1890).

22. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U. S.3, 11, 17 (1883) ; see King v. United States, 69 App. D. C.
10, 12-13, 98 F. 2d 291, 293 (1938) : "The Government's brief suggests, in
the vein of the Mikado, that because the first sentence was void appellant
'has served no sentence but has merely spent time in the penitentiary'; that
since he should not have been imprisoned as he was, he was not imprisoned
at all. The brief deduces the corollary that his non-existent punishment cannot possibly be 'increased.' As other corollaries it might be suggested that
he is liable in quasi-contract for the value of his board and. lodging, and
criminally liable for obtaining them under false pretenses. We cannot take
this optimistic view."
23. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 114 (1934) (Cardozo, J.).
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as to say that the defendant, having been imprisoned under a subsequently reversed judgment, was in the same position as though
24
he had never been sentenced at all, or had escaped between verdict

and sentence.2
(B)

The Spectre of Double Jeopardy

Ex parte Lange,26 led the courts to a great fear also that a

defendant might interpose the bar of double jeopardy, should the
first conviction or sentence be accorded any validity at all. Although
less had been decided, there were those words:
"The common law not only prohibited a second punishment for
the same offence, but it went further and forbid a second trial
for the same offence, whether the accused had suffered punishin the former trial he had been acment or not, and whether
' 27
quitted or convicted.

Under such a broad concept, if it were to be admitted that the
defendant had once been punished, by even a single day in jail, for
the same offense, then the only course would be to release him
absolutely. Reversal of the conviction could not then be followed
by a new trial; and reversal of the sentence only (e.g., for noncompliance with the statutory requirement as to allocution), could
not be followed by resentencing under a proper procedure.28
That the desideratum was a balance between fairness to the
defendant and fairness to society was not seen.2 9 The danger from

hyper-technical doctrines developed to mitigate a retributive criminal law justly caused Mr. Justice Holmes to complain:
"At the present time in this country there is more danger that
24. E.g., United States v. Harmon, 68 Fed. 472, 474 (D. Kan. 1895):

"The sentence of the court under which the defendant went to prison was
vo:d. It was the same in legal effect as if it had been rendered by a justice
of the peace or a United States Commissioner, or the same as if the circuit
court had ordered the defendant to be transported or hanged."
25. Jordan v. Swope, 36 N. M. 84, 87, 8 P. 2d 788 (1932).
26. 18 Wall. 163 (U.S. 1874).
27. Id. at 169.
28. This very reasoning was accepted in In re Johnson, 46 Fed. 477,
481 (C.C.D. Mass. 1891), and rejected in McCormick v. State, 71 Neb. 505,

508, 99 N. W. 237 (1904).

29. The decisions in McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155 (1891) ; Trezza
v. Brush, 142 U. S. 160 (1891) (affirming imposition of solitary confinement twice after two trials resulting in death sentences); and Murphy v.
Massachusetts, 177 U. S. 155 (1900) (rejecting defendant's argument that

the Constitution was violated when state courts allowed credit for prison
time served under a reversed sentence, but declined to remit requirement of
again serving one day in solitary confinement unless defendant would waive

non-compliance with the statute) were in very broad terms, not limited
to the bar of double jeopardy, but encompassing repeated punishment generally within the declaration that the defendant "waived" any objection
founded on the first conviction.
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criminals will escape justice than that they will be subjected to
tyranny." 30
Indeed, there grew up in the federal courts, with the Lange case
as root-stock, the doctrine that the double jeopardy protection
would be violated if a defendant once validly sentenced were resentenced, even at the same term, so as to increase his sentence. 31
Possibly common law precedents and orthodox interpretation of
punishment statutes would have led to the same result, but certainly such a doctrine should not have been placed upon constitutional
grounds. 32
Unfortunately also there was a common law doctrine, developed
in English decisions long since overruled, that even an erroneous
and illegal sentence could not be corrected.3 3 It took a considerable
time for courts to shed even such an unsound doctrine, and the
remnants contributed to the impetus to hold the first sentence
void in every way.

34

(C)

Other Factors

There are other elements besides this overemphasis upon the
nullity of the first proceeding which have brought courts to deny
credit for time served. There has been a conviction widely held
that the criminal law is one of the most exact and certain branches
of our law. Nicety of definition of .substantive crimes and considerable formalism in procedural matters have contributed to its
30. Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 134 (1904).
31. United States v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304 (1931) ; Roberts v. United
States, 320 U. S.264 (1943).
32. The Lange case had decided no more than that (1) the statute permitted confinement or fine, but not both; (2) after the defendant had paid the
maximum fine, under sentence to confinement and fine, the court could not
again sentence him, requiring confinement only. Common law procedure
then required one lawful sentence only.
33. King v. Ellis, 5 B. & C. 395, 400 (K.B. 1826) ; King v. Bourne, 7
A. & E. 58 (K.B. 1837) ; Whitehead v. Queen, 7 Q: B. 582 (1845). Reversal
was by statute, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 24, § 1 (1846).
34. The first fully considered rejection of the doctrine was in Beale v.
Commonwealth, 25 Pa. 11, 22 (1855) ; but the leading case is In re Bonner,
151 U. S. 242 (1894). However, the old learning was only slowly overturned. Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 2 Metc. 419 (Mass. 1841) (later reversed by statute) ; Elliott v. People, 13 Mich. 365 (1865), but compare
People v. Farrell, 146 Mich. 264, 109 N. W. 440 (1906); McDonald v.
State, 45 Md. 90 (1876) (later reversed by statute) ; In re Johnson 46 Fed.
477 (C.C.D. Mass. 1891), but compare In re Bonner, supra; Ex parte Cox,

3 Idaho 530, 32 Pac. 197 (1893) ; Adams v. State, 9 Ala. App. 89, 93-94, 64
So. 371, 372 (1913) ; Hickman v. Fenton, 120 Neb. 66, 68, 231 N. W. 510
(1930). Much of the history is reviewed in McCormick v. State, 71 Neb.
505, 510, 99 N. W. 237, 239 (1904).
The doctrine long persisted in Illinois, colored with strong constitutional overtones. See cases reviewed in United States ex rel. Freislinger on
behalf of Kappel v. Smith, 41 F. 2d 707 (7th Cir. 1930).
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development. 35 Every court must feel assured that it can determine what the punishment for a given offense must, under the
statute, be. In most of the statutory formulae for indeterminate
sentences, there is an apparent simplicity-in fact deceptive-which
is lost when the problem of what sentence to impose is complicated
by what has been done before, perhaps by another judge or another court or agency.

38

Related to this is the fear possessed by many courts that emotion might affect them when imposing criminal punishment .3 The
sentencing court may even find consolation in applying some logical rule, supported by considerable precedent, although it is clearly
harsh on the defendant and violates the sense of justice.38 The
temptation to impose punishment in a vacuum thus leads courts
to avoid the basic issue: Is there any rational justification for
punishing this defendant substantially more than others who committed the same offense, simply because this defendant was not
given a fair trial or was not properly sentenced the first time?
Now, there are some periods of confinement which are required
of criminal defendants without credit against their sentences. In
some jurisdictions no credit is given for time in custody awaiting
and attending trial.39 And others deny credit for time in custody
35. See Pound, The Adininistrative Application of Legal Standards, 44
A. B. A. Rep. 445, 454, 455 (1919) ; compare Coke's, The kwwiw certaitie of
the law is the safetie of all, quoted in Mikell, Cases on Criminal Law (Pref.

2d. ed. 1925).

36. See the difficulty of solution in Lindsey v. Superior Court of King

County, 33 Wash. 2d 94, 204 P. 2d 482 (1949) (defendant sentenced to
minimum term to be fixed by sentence board, with statutory maximum of
20 years; sentence board fixed minimum at 7Y2 years, with an ambiguous
notation that iy2 years in jail while appeal was pending had been considered; the state supreme court required the sentencing court and the

sentence board to indicate the calculations clearly).

37. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459 (1947);
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 628 (1937); Weems v.

United States, 217 U. S. 349, 382 (1910) (White, J., dissenting) ; State v.
Olander, 193 Iowa 1379, 1389, 186 N. W. 53 (1922) (Evans, J., concurring).
38. E.g., In re Doelle, 323 Mich. 241, 249, 35 N. W. 2d 251, 254-55

(1948) : "In the last analysis, the law is not vindictive, and possibly the
criminal code should be amended as was done in Iowa, so as to credit a
prisoner on a new sentence with the time he has served under a void sen-

tence. This also would bring uniformity in the practice." See State v. Lee

Lim, 79 Utah 68, 108-113, 7 P. 2d 825, 840 (1932) (Hansen, J., dissenting)
stating the void sentence doctrine with great clarity: "Coufrts refuse to
recognize a hybrid sentence which for one purpose is voidable or erroneous
and for another purpose is void."
39. Ryan v. State, 100 Ala. 105, 110, 14 So. 766, 767 (1893) (representing the common law practice). But compare Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431.150
(1948) (credit for jail time awaiting trial, against fine or jail sentence);
N. Y. Pen. Law § 2193 (credit for all pre-sentenced time against any
sentence of confinement) ; Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 19, § 894 (Supp. 1949)
(credit for all pre-sentence time, against any sentence of confinement), and
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while an appeal is pending.40 Those states which deny credit for
these periods regard such incarceration as mere custodial detention, intended to assure the presence of the defendant on those
occasions when bail is not allowed or the defendant cannot produce
it. 41 Normally, however, only short periods of time are involved
and a relatively small percentage of defendants are affected. Furthermore, several jurisdictions permit the defendant to elect to
commence his sentence during the pendency of his appeal. 42 This
also minimizes the inequality. But, of course, such short periods of

time in a jail are quite different from several years in a prisonusually at hard labor.
Another circumstance bringing courts to this unfortunate doctrine is the presence in nearly all jurisdictions of a parole system,
often coupled with an indeterminate sentence scheme of some
kind.-3 Under this, the function of the court in fixing the sentence
see Comm. ex rel. Lerner v. Smith, 151 Pa. Super. 265, 270, 30 A. 2d 347,
351 (1943) ; Tex. Stat., Code Crim. Proc. art. 768 (Cum. Supp. 1949) (discretionary credit for all pre-sentence time) ; Va. Code Ann. § 53-208
(1950) (credit for all pre-sentence jail time against any sentence of confinement); W. Va. Code Ann. § 6136 -(1949) (discretionary credit for all
pre-sentence jail time, against any sentence of confinement) ; Puerto Rico
Laws 1946, p. 752 # 293 (credit for all time deprived of liberty, against any
sentence of confinement) ; Byers v. United States, 175 F. 2d 654, 656 (10th
Cir. 1949) (held credit for pre-sentence time- discretionary- with sentencing
court, because 62 Stat. 838 (1948), 18 U. S. C. §,3568" (Supp. 1949) fixes
commencement of running of sentence from time defendant is received at
place, designated for service [or place to await transportation thereto]).
40. If bail not posted, must hold in custody without executing sentence:
E.g., Ariz. Code Ann. § 44-2523 (1939) ; Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2810 (1948) ;
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-8110 (1947) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2303 (Reissue 1948) ; S. D. Code § 34.4107-.4108 (1939) ; Utah Code Ann. § 10540-10 (1943); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 10-1411 (1945). Specific denial
of credit for time pending appeal: Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2505 (1937).
Granting credit for time served under the sentence pending appeal, if judgment is affirmed: E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38, § 778 (1935) ; Ind. Ann. Stat.
§ 9-2316 (Burns 1942) (if defendant surrenders himself within terms of any
bail accepted after sentence commenced) ; Me. Rev. Stat. c. 135, § 29
(1944) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 1978 (1942) ; R. I. Gen. Laws c. 630, § 5 (1938).
Granting credit for all confinement after sentence: E.g., N. J. Stat. Ann. §
2:192-13 (1939).
41. People ex rel. Stokes v. Warden, 66 N. Y. 342, 345 (1876); Ex
parte Duckett, 15 S. C. 210 (1881) ; Hall v. Patterson, 45 Fed. 352, 357
(1891) ; Ryan v. State, 100 Ala. 105, 110, 14 So. 766, 767 (1893). Of course,
one difficulty is that jail life is not usually so arduous as prison life so that
punishment is not wholly equivalent. Dimmick v. Tompkins, 194 U. S. 540
(1904) ; see Fairley v. State, 114 Miss. 510, 513, 75 So. 374 (1917) (Ethridge,
J., dissenting).
42. Fed. R. Crim. P. 38 (a) (2) (1948) : "A sentence of imprisonment
shall be stayed if an appeal is taken and the defendant elects not to commence service of the sentence or is admitted to bail." See Tilghman v. Hunter,
168 F. 2d 946 (10th Cir. 1948) ; Mitchell v. Sanford, 161 F. 2d 374 (5th Cir.
1947). See also, Ala. Code, tit. 15, § 3,73 (1940); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 924.22
(1944).
43. In 1939, only three states lacked parole laws, but twelve jurisdic-
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is reduced to determining a maximum and minimum term, or even
fixing a minimum term and advising the defendant that there is a
certain mandatory maximum term; or in a few jurisdictions, fixing
the sentence amounts to no more than telling the defendant that
the statute requires a specified minimum and maximum term.
The actual time to be served is decided by an administrative board
-variously known as a sentence, parole, or prison board. 44 That
agency considers the defendant's chances for reform if released,
predicating its judgment on his past record, his prison conduct,
natural capacity and character, family background and the like.4 5
Where sentencing has become such a mechanical thing, with the
typical sentence for a serious felony being one to twenty years at
hard labor, the court can scarcely be blamed for considering its
function as routine. And, of course, with credits for good prison
conduct available, and the defendant whose conduct is good becoming eligible for parole after serving about two-thirds of the
minimum term, there is little chance that the board will permit the
aggregate time served under both sentences to exceed the statutory
4

maximumi.

0

Of course, courts would be justified in regarding many a defendant as a poor risk to have in society. But the legislature has
not said, or even implied, that the defendant should be subjected
to preventive detention beyond the fair and lawful punishment for
his offense. 4 And at any event, the effect of denying credit for the
first sentence is to extend the time the defendant must serve (as
compared with others properly sentenced the first time for the
same crime) in order to become eligible for parole or absolute release. Furthermore, it must be remembered that under most systems the administrative boards have wide discretion in granting
parole, so that it is not an adequate answer to tell the defendant
that the parole board will probably take into consideration the
time served on the first sentence. 48
tions (including the Federal System) had no indeterminate sentence law.
4 Att'y Gen. Survey of Release Procedures 20 (1939).
44. All the cases cited note 1 supra, involved sentences of this type.
45. The federal statutory standard is one of the oldest and typical: "If
it appears ... that there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will
live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if ... such release
i; not incompatible with the welfare of society. . . ." 36 Stat. 819 (1910), as
amended, 18 U. S. C. § 4203 (Supp. 1949).
46. Credits for good prison conduct are virtually universal. See statutes
collected in 1 Att'y Gen. Survey of Release Procedures (1939).
47. Even a prisoner under a life sentence may become eligible for
parole. E.g., State ex rel. Drankovich v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 433, 22 N. W.
2d 540 (1946).
48. See Lindsey v. Superior Court of King County, 33 Wash. 2d 94,
204 P. 2d 483 (1949).
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Related to this is the effect of the separation of powers doctrine.
Nearly all courts which deny credit state that they must find some
express constitutional or statutory authority for allowing credit
against the second sentence.4 9 They argue that because the legislature has fixed the punishment for a given crime, for example, at
between one and twenty years at hard labor there is no room to
exact such imprisonment under anything but the lawful (i.e. second)
sentence. Of course, when the defendant has served the prescribed
time, as punishment for the same offense, the consequence the

legislature has attached to the crime has followed, and whether it
has been incurred under the first or second sentence is an inconsequential fortuity to both the defendant and society.
Another phase of the separation of powers doctrine is the idea
that the granting of credit interferes with the pardon power.50 This
reasoning is possible only when the courts treat the first sentence
as void, for the function of the pardon power is to relieve an
offender from the punishment prescribed for his offense. It can
hardly be said that courts, in giving credit for time served under a
subsequently vacated sentence, forgive all or part of the punishment; rather they do no more than recognize that the punishment
which the defendant has undergone was for this very same offense,
and that a portion of the price for the crime has been exacted under
the earlier sentence.
Possibly one of the strongest reasons for this denial of credit
is the desire of courts to discourage appeals.5 1 Belated review of a
host of cases has followed the decision of Betts v. Brady,5 2 requiring state courts to furnish counsel in order that the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process requirements might be met, at least in
cases where youth, inexperience, local hostility, or the nature of
the charge, make trial without counsel unfair. 53 Reversals in such
49. People ex rel. Boyle v. Ragen, 400 IIl. 571, 573-74, 81 N. E. 2d

444, 445, cert. denied, 335 U. S. 868 (1948) ; In re Doelle, 323 Mich. 241, 245,
249, 35 N. W. 2d 251, 253, 255 (1949) ; Ex parte Wilkerson, 76 Okla. Crim.
204, 135 P. 2d 507 (1943).
50. People v. Lueckfield, 396 Ill. 520, 72 N. E. 2d 198 (1947); Ex
parte Wilkerson, 76 Okla. Crim. 204, 208, 135 P. 2d 507, 509 (1943) ; Ogle
v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 219, 63 S. W. 1009 (1901).
51. Illinois' labyrinthian appellate procedure has, of course, been notorious. See speech Chief Justice Vinson, Sept. 7, 1949, 69 Sup. Ct. v. (1949)

Note, 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 855, 862-64 (1949).

52. 316 U. S. 455 (1942), followed in, Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 642,
677 (1948).
53. Arising from deprivation-of-counsel cases were State ex rel. Drankovich v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 433, 22 N. W. 2d 540 (1946) ; McDowell v. State,
225 Ind. 495, 76 N. E. 2d 249 (1947); and It re De Meerleer, 323 Mich.
287, 35 N. W. 2d 255 (1948) (all denying credit) ; State v. Stroemple, 355
Mo. 1147, 199 S. W. 2d 913, cert. denied, 331 U. S. 857 (1947) (apparently
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cases, at this late date, make necessary new trials in which the
prosecution may be handicapped by the absence of witnesses, the
shortness of memory, and the leniency of the jury toward a defendant who has already suffered long imprisonment. 54
In Illinois, one of the most severe problems arose when the
1941 indeterminate sentence law was declared unconstitutional in
1942.1' In the interim many defendants were sentenced under the
unconstitutional enactment. Upon resentencing-even though no
retrial was involved-the Illinois courts refused credit. 56 Likewise
they have refused credit when the original sentences have been
excessive or otherwise illegal.57 The only credit the Illinois courts
have regularly allowed is where the defendant has already served
a period in excess of the statutory maximum.5s
Consequently it is clear that a number of factors have induced
courts to adopt this doctrine. There are strong reasons impelling
them to do so, but unfortunately they do not lead to either sound
interpretation of punishment statutes or substantial fairness in
administering the criminal law.
(D)
The Effects of the Inequity
The results are undesirable for many reasons. First, there is an
inevitable sense of discontent among both the prisoners affected and
granting credit but properly denying contention that any sentence after retrial violated the double jeopardy protections). Compare Stonebreaker v.
Smyth, 187 Va. 250, 46 S. E. 2d 406 (1948) ; Comm. ex rel. Townsend v.
Burke, 361 Pa. 35, 42, 63 A. 2d 77 (1949) (granting credit).
54. In re Doelle, 323 Mich. 241, 249, 35 N. W. 2d 251, 255 (1948)
"Defendant made no claim of improper sentence until over seven years had
elapsed and as the trial judge stated it had become difficult to obtain the testimony offered at the first trial in behalf of the plaintiff." In Ogle v. State, 43
Tex. Crim. 219, 221, 233, 63 S. W. 1009, 1012 (1901), the original conviction of murder in the second degree with a sentence of 99 years was set

aside 17 years later, the defendant retried, and again convicted of murder
in the second degree. Despite an instruction iwt to consider the fact defendant had been imprisoned some 17 years, the jury fixed the punishment
at 5 years.
55. People v. Montana, 380 Ill. 596, 608-09, 44 N. E. 2d 569 (1942)
(violative of separation of powers to subject judicially imposed maximum and

minimum sentences to administrative revision).
56. Typical are People v. Wilson, 391 Ill. 463, 63 N. E. 2d 488, 575
(1945), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 801 (1946) (no credit for three years
served) ; People v. Starks, 395 Ill. 567, 71 N. E. 2d 23 (1947) (no credit for
three years as of right but dictum that credit could be given by sentencing
court shortening the maximum). Worse than this is the loss of good time
credits and postponement of eligility for parole. See note 4 supra.
57. People v. Atkinson, 376 I1. 623, 35 N. E. 2d 58 (1941) ; People
v. Lueckfield, 396 Ii. 520, 72 N. E. 2d 198 (1947); People v. Williams,
404 Ill. 624, 89 N. E. 2d 822 (1950).
58. People v. Huber, 389 II1. 192, 58 N. E. 2d 879 (1945) ; People v.
-French, 387 Ill. 16, 55 N. E. 2d 53 (1944) ; People v. Brown, 383 Ill. 287,
48 N. E. 2d 953 (1943).
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the public at large, because the law is operating irrationally. To
require A to serve substantially more time than B, for the same
offense, simply because A was improperly tried and sentenced in
the first place, is to discriminate without reason. It is hard enough
to explain to a lay person why the few weeks or months spent in
jail before trial, or while an appeal is pending, are not credited. 5
But it makes little sense to anyone when courts require defendants
to throw years in prison into the bottomless pit of legal anachronism.
Indicative of the reaction are the repeated assaults made by defendants (and, necessarily, the profession which represents them).
Furthermore, judges at the trial level have often tried to ameliorate
the harshness of the doctrine by evasive devices.60 This brings with
it a waste of judicial and executive time, for multiple appeals, and
applications for parole or pardon in one form or another are predicated upon the very inequity of the treatment.6 '
Another difficulty which the layman also resents is the effect
that such denial of credit has upon the function of the jury in
determination of guilt. Thus, where the court believes that at the
second trial the jury sought to make allowance for the time the
defendant had already served by finding him guilty of a lesser
offense only, and consequently denies credit against the sentence
ultimately imposed, the effect is to deprive the jury of its proper
function. The court's surmise nay be correct, but it cannot be
denied that where, for example, the charge is murder in the first
degree, and instructions are given allowing the jury to consider
manslaughter, the twelve finders of fact well might find, independently of any notion of balancing the accounts, that the de62 fendant was guilty of nothing more than manslaughter.
59. The large number of jurisdictions which, during the past two
decades, have adopted statutes allowing credit, indicates the modern judgment as to the fairness of the proposition. See notes 39, 40 supra, and text at
notes 69-88 infra.
60. Consider People v. Green, 394 Ill. 173, 175, 68 N. E. 2d 263, 264
(1946) (trial court said: "It is further ordered by the Court that the minimum of three years be considered served."). In People ex rel. Barrett v.
Bardens, 394 Ill. 511, 68 N. E. 2d 710 (1946) the trial court, on remand for
resentencing, placed the defendant on probation, although the defendant had
already served nearly three years; the State Supreme Court reversed.
61. The case of De Meerleer is typical: (1) denial of motion for leave
to file a delayed motion for new trial, affirmed, 313 Mich. 548, 21 N. W. 2d
849 (1946) ; (2) reversed and remanded, 329 U. S. 663 (1947) ; (3) new
trial resulting in conviction of manslaughter; (4) hearing in trial court on
issue whether any sentence could be imposed; (5) denial of habeas corpus
to relieve from sentence which denied credit for time served, 323 Mich. 287,
35 N. W. 2d 255 (1948) ; (6) certiorari denied, 336 U. S. 946 (1949)
(7) defendant released on parole (1949).
62. In re De Meerleer, 323 Mich. 287, 35 N. E. 2d 255 (1948) (involved
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The result of all these considerations is that there is no sound
rationale for this treatment of an unfortunate class of criminal defendants. Thie injustice and illegality of the treatment the defendant
has received before his first sentence began is no justification for
discriminating against him at a second proceeding. In the field of
punishment for crime, the range of governmental operation is admittedly broad, as the indeterminate sentence, recidivist, and juvenile delinquency statutes witness. Still, as Mr. Justice Brandeis
once wrote:
". the classification must rest upon a difference which is real,
as distinguished from one which is seeming, specious, or fanciful, so that all actually situated similarly will be treated alike;
...the object of the classification must be the accomplishment of
a purpose or the promotion of a policy... ;... the difference
must bear a relation to the object of the legislation which is substantial as distinguished
from one which is speculative, remote,
63
or negligible.

It scarcely needs argument to show that the circumstance that
the defendant has received treatment in the first instance which was
violative of the Constitution is not a valid reason for making the
distinction. Nor is it a policy congruent with our Constitution to
permit courts to deny credit for time already served, and thus
discourage the use of review procedures. Nor for that matter, are
state constitutional objections sufficient grounds for denying the
64
federal guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
Although several petitions have been made, not yet has the
United States Supreme Court undertaken to review such a case. 65
Perhaps it may be too narrow an issue to warrant the expenditure
of the Court's carefully rationed time, or possibly the cases presented have not drawn the federal question with exactitude. Nevertheless, the least that can be said is that there is considerable doubt
original conviction on plea of guilty to murder in first degree, entered without advice of counsel; the retrial resulted in a jury finding defendant guilty
of manslaughter). Ogle v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 219, 63 S. W. 1009 (1901),
and Ex parte Wilkerson, 76 Okla. Crim. 204, 135 P. 2d 507 (1943) involved
similar situations. In the former, the jury fixed the defendant's punishment
for murder in the second degree at 5 years, after defendant had served 17
years under the original sentence of 99 years imprisonment. The jury had
been instructed not to consider the time the defendant had served. The court
denied credit against the five year sentence. In the latter, the jury fixed the
defendant's punishment at five years, after defendant had served 5 years
and 7 months of the original sentence of 40 years. Whenever the jury fixes the
Punishment as well as determines guilt vel non, it is very difficult to determine whether double credit is involved.
63. See Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 406
(1928) (dissenting opinion).
64. U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1; Art. VI, cl. 2.
65. See cases cited notes 1, 49 supra.
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about the constitutionality of the practice. And considering the
great number of jurisdictions which have, by statute or decision,
taken a positive stand requiring that credit be given, it would
seem to be the sense of the country as a whole that denial of credit
is an intolerable abuse of criminal process.6"
III. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
One unfortunate feature of the situation is that most of the
states, in adopting the docirine, have coupled the decision with a
pronouncement that it is the legislature which is to blame. In nearly all cases, the legislature has been silent as the Sphinx in the
matter and the implications of the several judicial conceptions we
have discussed are the source of the trouble.6 7 Consequently it
appears that statutory correction of the situation is essential.0 8 The
courts are unable to reverse their position without incurring the
wrath of those who have already been denied credit. And perhaps
jurisdictions under pressure from many belated criminal appeals
are unwilling to do so. Consequently only a broad legislative enactment can hope to correct the difficulty definitively. Furthermore,
continued legislative acquiescence may well be taken as approval
of the doctrine and perhaps greater extension will occur.
66. See statutes discussed in text at notes 69-88 infra. Consider also that
without direct statutory authority federal courts generally allow substantial
credit, although with varying exactitude: King v. United States, 69 App.
D. C. 10, 98 F. 2d 291 (1938) ; Mitchell v. Youell, 130 F. 2d 880, 882
(4th Cir. 1942) ; McDonald v. Moinet, 139 F. 2d 939, 941 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 322 U. S. 730 (1944) ; Tinkoff v. United States, 86 F. 2d 868, 880
(7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U. S. 689 (1937) ; and Bryant v. United
States, 214 Fed. 41 (8th Cir. 1914). Also granting credit, without direct

statutory authority: State v. Nelson, 160 Fla. 744, 36 So. 2d 427 (1948) ;
Helton v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 616, 618, 15 So. 2d 416 (1943) ("Otherwise petitioner would be done a grave injustice."); Owen v. Comm., 214 Ky. 394,

283 S. W. 400 (1926) ; Jackson v. Comm., 187 Ky. 760, 220 S. W. 1045 (1920)

(a leading case) ; State ex rel. Petcoff v. Reed, 138 Minn. 465, 468, 163 N. W.
984, 985 (1917) ; Laury v. State, 187 Tenn. 391, 215 S. W. 2d 797 (1948) ;
State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P. 2d 825 (1932) (assuming credit was
properly allowed).
67. Aside from the constitutional objection, the position taken in State
ex rel. Drankovich v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 433, 22 N. W. 2d 540 (1946)
might possibly be said to be supported by the implication of Wis. Stat.
§ 359.07 (1947) : ".... All sentences shall commence at twelve o'clock, noon,
on the day of such sentence, but any time which may elapse after such
sentence, while such convict is confined in the county jail, or is at large on
bail, or while his case is pending in the supreme court upon writ of error or
otherwise, shall not be computed as part of the term of such sentence. .. "
(Enacted 1943, Italics added.) But it is scarcely conceivable that the legislative purpose included cases in which appeal was "pending" for eleven
years.
The italicized portion was deleted by Wis. Laws 1946-47, c. 631, § 166.
See Wis. Stat. § 359.07 (1949).
68. See text to note 49 supra.
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Alternatives-Good and Bad
(A)
Now the few statutes dealing with this problem fall generally
into three classes:
1. Granting discretion to the courts to allow or deny credit ;G9
2. Requiring credit at resentence after reversal;70
3. Requiring credit for all time in custody awaiting and attending trial, and prosecuting appeal."
(1) Discretionary Credit
The discretionary power72 has all the evils and dangers of discretion uncontrolled by a statutory standard or expressed legislative purpose. Furthermore it invites contests over what is an abuse
of discretion. The only benefit from allowing judicial freedom to
grant or withhold credit is that it enables courts to combat abuses
69. Texas, West Virginia, and Kansas. See note 72 infra.

70. Arkansas, North Dakota, Iowa, Washington, Maryland, Massa-

chusetts, California, and Puerto Rico. See notes 74, 79, 81, 83, and 84 infra.
71. New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See note 88 infra.
72. (a) Credit againstany sentence of confinement:

(1) Tex. Stat. Code Crim. Proc. art. 768 (Cum. Supp. 1949) : "If a new

trial is not granted, nor judgment arrested in felony cases, the sentence shall
be pronounced in the presence of the defendant at any time after the expiration of the time allowed for making the motion for a new trial or the
motion in arrest of judgment; provided that in all criminal cases the judge
of the court in which defendant was convicted, may within his discretion,
give the defendant credit on his sentence for the time, or any part thereof,
which said defendant has spent in jail in said cause, from the time of his
arrest and confinement until his sentence by the trial court; and provided
further that in all cases where the defendant has been tried for any violation of the laws of the State of Texas, and has been convicted and has appealed from said judgment and/or sentence of conviction, and where said
cause has been affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, and after receipt
of the mandate by the Clerk of the trial court, the judge is authorized to
again call said defendant before him, and, if, pending appeal, the defendant
has not made bond or entered into recognizance and has remabied in jail
pending the time of such appeal, said trial judge nay then in his discretion
resentenyce the defendant, and way subtract from the original sentence
pronounced upon the defendant, the length of time the defendant has lain
in jail pending such appeal; provided, however, that the provisions of this
Act shall not apply after conviction and sentence in felony cases in which
bond or recognizance is not permitted by law."
(2) W. Va. Code Ann. § 6136 (1949) : "Whenever any person is convicted of an offense in a court of this State having jurisdiction thereof, and
sentenced to confinement in jail or the penitentiary of this State, or by a
justice of the peace having jurisdiction of the offence, such person, may, in
the discretion of the court or justice, be given credit on any sentence imposed by such court or justice for the term of confinement spent in jail
awaiting such trial or conviction."
(b) Credit 'agaizstany jail sentence:
(1) Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 62-1533 (Cum. Supp. 1947): "In any
criminal action in which the defendant pleads guilty to a misdemeanor or
is found guilty of a misdemeanor by a jury, or by the court if the trial is
by the court, the judge, if he sentences the defendant to jail, may deduct from
the sentence the time, if any, the defendant has spent in jail pending the dis.
position of the defendant's case." (Italics added.)
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like prolonged frivolous appeals and other dilatory tactics. But the
light is scarcely worth the candle. Stiffened bail requirements and
affirmative expedition of the calendar by strict enforcement of court
7 3
rules are better correctives than ad hoc refusal of equal treatment.
At any rate, dilatory practices art not usually employed by men in
jail or prison. Even those held in jail pending appeal hardly find
the difference between jail life and prison life worth prolongation
of the review.
(2)

Mandatory Credit

The mandatory credit for time served on a sentence subsequently reversed has the advantage of eliminating the doubt, confusion,
and contestability of the discretionary credit. Yet the statutes which
have adopted it usually have suffered from a lack of broad generality. Thus four states74 have pre-1900 provisions which require the credit only when there has been a retrial-no express
provision being made for credit on resentence after reversal of the
judgment only. It well may be that the legislatures in those states
desired that courts, a fortiori, grant credit on resentence without
retrial. But that interpretation has not been consistently followed. 5 And furthermore some of these statutes are narrow in
other respects: allowing credit only for time "in the penitentiary,"--6
or for time "imprisoned in the execution of the judgment appealed
73. See Holtzoff, Defects in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 9
F. R.D. 303, 305 (1949).
74.
(a) Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2728 (1947) : "If the defendant upon
the itew trial is again convicted, the period of his former confinement it; the
penitentiary shall be deducted by the court from the period of confinement
fixed in the last verdict of conviction."
(b) N. D. Rev. Code § 29-2834 (1943): "If a defendant, during the
pendency of an appeal, has been imprisoned in; the execution of the judgment appealed from, and upon a new trial ordered by the supreme court shall
be again.convicted, the period of his former imprisonment shall be deducted by
the district court from the period of his imprisonment to be fixed on the last
verdict of conviction."
(c) Iowa Code § 793.26 (1946) : "If a defendant, imprisoned during the
pendency of an appeal, upon a new trial ordered by the supreme court is
again convicted, the period of his former imprisomnnent shall be deducted
from the period of imprisonment to be fixed on the last verdict of conviction."
(Originally Iowa Revised Stat. § 4933 (1860).)
(d) Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1750 (Remington, 1932): "If a defendant
who has been in prison during the pendency of an appeal, upon a new trial
ordered by the supreme court, shall be again convicted, the period of his
former imprisonment shall be deducted, by the superior court from the
period of imprisonment to be fixed on the last verdict of conviction." (Italics
added.)
75. Compare State v. Malusky, 59 N. D. 501, 514, 230 N. W. 735, 741
(1930), with State v. Lindsey, 194 Wash. 129, 133-34, 77 P. 2d 596, 598
(1938).
76. Ark., see note 74 (a) supra.
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from"
peal."

7

7

or for time imprisoned "during the pendency of an ap-

On the other hand, the Maryland statute,7 9 adopted with the
avowed purpose of reversing a contrary decision," allows credit
only when the new sentence follows reversal of the previous judgment or sentence alone, and makes no provision for resentence
after a new trial.8 ' Of course, there may have been a fear that a
double jeopardy defense might be possible at retrial if the first
82
sentence were treated as valid punishment.
Recently California adopted a provision prescribing mandatory credit for all confinement under invalidated or modified
judgments.8 3 Couched in general terms, it avoids the error of correcting one injustice only to create another. This general approach
was also employed in a Puerto Rican statute enacted in 1946.84
However, the Puerto Rican provision, in its entirety, has the
broadest scope of all-allowing credit for all confinement prior to
sentence, during the pendency of appeal, and under a subsequently
annulled, vacated, or suspended sentence.8 5
77. N. D., see note 74 (b) .upra.

78. N. D., Iowa, Wash., see note 74 (b), (c), (d) supra.

79. Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 5, § 87 (1939): "Whenever any
writ of error or appeal shall be brought upon any judgment, or any indictment, information, presentment, inquisition or conviction in any criminal
case, and thze court of appeals shall reverse the judgment for error in the
judgment, or sentence itself, it shall be the duty of the court of appeals to
remit the record to the court below, in order that such court may pronounce

the proper judgment upon such indictment, information, presentment, inquisition, or conviction; provided, however, that it shall be the duty of the court
in passing any sentence under the provisions of this section to deduct from
the term of sentence the thne already served by the prisoner under the previous sentence from the date of his conviction." (Italics added.)
80. McDonald v. State, 45 Md. 90 (1876) had followed the early
English cases cited note 33 supra. See Lynn v. State, 84 Md. 67, 83 (1896).
81. Similarly, in Massachusetts, where credit has usually been allowed
(see Murphy v. Commonwealth, 174 Mass. 369, 372-73, 54 N. E. 860, 862
(1899)), a limited statutory provision was made in Mass. Ann. Laws, c. 278,
§ 28C (Supp. 1949): "[Special sentence revision court may impose corrected sentence.] . . . Time served on a sentence appealed from shall be
deemed to have been served on a substituted sentence."
82. See text at note 26 mpra.
83. Cal. Pen. Code § 2900.1 (1949): "Where 'a defendant has served
any portion of his sentence under commitment based upon a judgment
which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal
act or acts."
84. Puerto Rico Laws 1946, p. 752, # 293, § 3: "The time that a person
may have been deprived of his liberty under a sentence that is subsequently annulled or reversed, shall be fully deducted from the prison term that said
person must serve in case he is imprisoned again for the same offenses for
which he was imposed the sentence so annulled or reversed." (This official
translation has suffered.)
85. Puerto Rico Laws 1946, p. 752, # 293, § 1: "The time that a person
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This broadest corrective has the advantage of simplicity and
uniformity, although there is needless repetition in the Puerto Rican
formula. It is desirable, if feasible, to fell the whole shambles of
error at one blow; and to allow credit for time awaiting trial,
prosecuting appeal, and the like, in order to prevent as much as
possible unnecessary and irrational inequalities in the treatment
of criminals. 8a On the other hand, the specific correctives have
some practical advantage in their very limitation. By restricting the
modification to the resentence problem-a definite evil of considerable proportions-the chance of passage by legislatures conservative as to change in the criminal law, is improved.87
(3)
Credit for Pre-sentence Confinement
The third type of statute"" simply requires that credit be allowed for all pre-sentence confinement attributable to the same
cilarged with the commission of any public offense may have been deprived
of his liberty, shall be fully deducted from the prison term. . ...
§ 2: "The time that a person may have been deprived of his liberty
awaiting the result of an appeal taken from the sentence imposed upon him,
shall be fully deducted ..

§ 4: "The time that a person may have been deprived of his liberty under
a sentence which is subsequently suspended shall be fully deducted... :'
86. Compare the English Criminal Justice Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6,
c. 58: § 38 requires credit for time in custody during pendency of appeals
(under special conditions as an appellant) only for a period in excess of
six weeks, unless leave to appeal, or a certificate of probable cause is
granted, with discretion in the Court of Criminal Appeal to allow further
credit. The English have treated this problem of equality of sentences with
great care because of its effect upon the attitude of the convict. See the
opinion of Lord Goddard, C. J. in Rex v. Payne, [1950] 1 All Eng. Rep. 102,
103: "This man received a heavier sentence than the other two because he
was tried in a different court on a different day. This is a most inconvenient
practice and it ought to cease. . . .It can only lead to different sentences
being passed, and will, naturally, leave a sense of grievance in the minds of
prisoners."
87. In California, on the whole credit had been allowed, but there were
decisions and dicta denying credit where the vacated sentence and the resentence were to confinement in different types of institutions. E.g., Ex parte
Ralph, 27 Cal. 2d 866, 872, 168 P. 2d 1, 5 (1946) ; Ex parte Wilson, 202
Cal. 341, 345, 260 Pac. 542, 543 (1927).
88. (1) N. Y. Pen. Law § 2193: "Any time spent by a person convicted
of a crime in a prison or jail prior to his conviction and before sentence has
been pronounced upon him, shall become and be calculated as a part of the
term of the sentence imposed upon him, whether such sentence is an indeterminate one or for a definite period of time; and such time shall, in addition,
to the discretionary reduction allowed under the provisions of the correction law, be deducted from the term of the sentence so imposed, under the
provisions of article nine of the correction law .. "
(2) Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 894 (Supp. 1949): "From and after the
passage of this act, all sentences for criminal offenses of persons who at the
time sentence is imposed are held in custody in default of bail, or otherwise,
shall begin to run and be computed from the date of conmnitment for the
offense for which said sentence shall be imposed, unless the person sentenced
shall then be undergoing imprisonment under a sentence imposed for any
other offense or offenses, [in which case the court shall direct whether the
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criminal offense. While these statutes were drawn with the primary
object of changing the prior rule which denied credit for jail time
awaiting or attending trial, their ultimate effect is to move the
date of commencement of service of sentence back to the time the
defendant was last arrested for one and the same offense. 9 Of
course, credit is not, and should not be allowed for time not actually in custody. There must be no windfall for the defendant who is
released on personal recognizance or bail.
One thing this third type of statute accomplishes most effectively is the elimination of the distinction between time served in
jail, reformatory, house of correction, and prison, for the purpose
of giving credit.9 ° One of the chief reasons courts did not undertake,
without statutory authority, to allow credit for pre-sentence jail
time was the absence of the strict regimen and hard labor of the
other institutions."' But, of course, from the prisoner's point of
view, the basic punishment is not the regimen or the labor, but the
loss of his liberty. Consequently jail and prison confinement are
basically equivalent, so that a convict who receives credit for proportionately greater jail time is not being favored substantially.
new sentence will run concurrently or consecutively]." (Italics added.) Comm.
ex rel. Accobacco v. Burke, 162 Pa. Super. 592, 596, 60 A. 2d 426, 429
(1948) indicates that "commitment" here means the act of placing in
custody after arraignment to await trial.
(3) Va. Code Ann. § 53-208 (1950) :"Any person who may be sentenced
by any court to a term of confinzement in the penitentiary, or by any court or
trial justice to a-term of confineement in jail, for the commission of a crime,
or in jail for default in the payment of a fine, shall have deducted from any
such term all time actually spent by such person in jail or the penitentiary
awaiting trial, or pending'an appeal, and it shall be the duty of the court or
trial justice, when entering the final order in any such case, to provide that
such person so convicted be given credit for the time so spent. [No deduction shall be allowed for time not actually confined, nor to escapees; but the
sunperintendent of the pentitentiary shall allow deduction to those now confined.]" (Italics added.)
89. The effect of the discretionary credits allowed in Texas, West
Virginia, and Kansas (see note 74 supra) is, within the limits of those
statutes, the same. And Puerto Rico has prescribed a credit for pre-sentence
time by means of a separate section of its statute. See § 1, note 85 supra.
90. See note 88 supra: (1) N. Y.: "Any time spent . . . in a prison
or jail. . .
(2) Pa.: "...
held in custody in default of bail, or otherwise, shall
begin to run and be computed from the date of commitment...."
(3) Va.: ".... all time actually spent ... in jail or the penitentiary...
See also, note 83 supra: Cal.: ". . . any portion of his sentence under commitment. . . ." And also, note 84 supra: Puerto Rico: "The time that a person may have been deprived of his liberty. ..."
91. See cases cited note 41 supra. Of course, the cost of confinement in
jail is usually greater than in prison because prisoners in jail are not required to work. See Fairley v. State, 114 Miss. 510, 513, 75 So. 374, 375
(1917) (Ethridge, J., dissenting).
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From the administrative point of view, there is a definite advantage in the simplicity of treating confinement of all types as
fungible.92
(B) Who and How?
A few of the jurisdictions which have adopted these corrective
statutes have also prescribed what agency is to allow credit, and
in what manner. If the statutes are to be really effective, they must,
as we have seen, be mandatory, and they must make clear which
governmental body is to allow the credit. Only by thus clarifying
the procedure can there be assurance that each defendant will receive his credit, and receive it only once.93
The alternatives available are several, and the choice depends
to some extent on larger questions of penal policy than concern this
paper. On the whole, where the jury fixes the punishment, it is
probably better to instruct them not to allow credit, because the
court will.9 4 Then the jury can direct itself to the instant case only,

and the defendant can see for himself that the allowance has in fact
been made, without proximate danger of double credit.
A closer question is whether the court, the prison authority, or
the sentence board should make the deduction in jurisdictions
where the court fixes the punishment. This depends partly on the
mechanics of handling the commitment papers. Some jurisdictions
have left it to the prison authority on the ground that the clerical
data can be more easily transferred when the prisoner is recommitted under sentence or moved to a new place of confinement. 95 In those states where sentence boards fix the minimum
92. When defendant has been erroneously confined in the penitentiary
for an offense requiring only confinement in county jail, Pennsylvania courts
allow commensurately greater credit than the actual time served. Comm.
ex rel. Stuckey v. Burke, 165 Pa. Super. 636, 70 A. 2d 466 (1950). On the
other hand, California denied credit when the subsequently vacated sentence
was of lesser severity, but noted that the state board of prison directors
would probably consider the time served. Ex pgrte Wilson, 202 Cal. 341,
260 P. 542 (1927).
93. Leaving it indefinite are: Cal. Pen. Code § 2900.1 (1949) (".
such time shall be credited ... .") ; Mass. Ann. Laws c. 278, § 28C (Supp.
1949) (". . . Time served . .. shall be deemed ..
")
94. Reed v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 41, 44, 177 S. W. 2d 784, 785 (1944)
(since court had discretion to award credit for pre-sentence jail time,
defendant's counsel properly prevented from arguing to jury that it should
consider the time defendant had spent in jail). But compare Hale v. Comm.,
137 Va. 774, 119 S. E. 49 (1923) (error to instruct jury to disregard the
time served, because court would later make the deduction; jury should
be allowed, but not required, to consider time already served, along with
other factors relevant to fixing punishment).
95. N. Y. Pen. Law § 2193: ". . . Prior to imposition of sentence, a
certificate shall be furnished to the judge who is to impose sentence, by
the officer having custody of the defendant, showing the length of time spent
by the defendant in a prison or jail prior to his conviction and before sentence.
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sentence after an observation period, necessarily the credit must be
considered in fixing the tentative date of earliest discharge. 6
Where the court has an effective discretion in fixing the sentence,
it is very desirable that the court itself make the deduction.97 This
is for two reasons: (1) it brings home to the court the circumstance of the previous sentence and so dramatizes the fact that the
second sentence is in a sense nunc pro tunc; (2) it makes certain
to the defendant that the credit has been allowed by the final adjudicating body.
Whichever procedure is adopted, it is essential that the credit
appear accurately and definitely on the record for all to see. By
converting the credit into an automatic, mandatory deduction, at
some stage, the possibility of litigation is almost eliminated, and
in cases of error or marginal dispute, mandamus is a reasonably
clear-cut remedy.9 A further advantage is that the spectre of
double credit is obliterated, so that there is no temptation to lay
down a general rule denying all credit in order to prevent a defendant from asserting a claim to credit which probably has already
been allowed. 99
At the time of commitment . . . it shall be the duty of the officer . . . to
indorse upon the commitment papers the length of time spent by the person
convicted in a prison or jail prior to his conviction and before sentence
which is to be calculated as part of the term of sentence imposed upon such

person." Puerto Rico Laws 1946, p. 752, # 293, § 6: "The deductions mentioned in this Act shall be made by the proper penal authorities with prefer-

ence over any other reductions or deductions authorized by other laws, except

where it is otherwise provided in said law." (Italics added.)
96. Lindsey v. Superior Court of King County, 33 Wash. 2d 94, 104, 204
P. 2d 482, 487 (1949) : "We are of the opinion, and declare, that in a case
where a convicted person is entitled to a time credit for prior imprisonment,
the judgment and sentence entered by the superior court should so state

on its face, and that such credit should then apply on the maximum sentence
imposed by the court and also upon the 'duration of confinement' when fixed

by the board of prison terms and paroles; this can easily be accomplished
by having the judgment state the time from which the sentence and imprisonment thereunder shall run.'
97. Prescribing that the court make the deduction: Kansas, Texas,
West Virginia, note 72 supra; Arkansas, Iowa, North Dakota, Washington, note 74 supra; Pennsylvania, Virginia, note 88 supra.
98. Employed in substance in Lindsey v. Superior Court of King

County, 33 Wash. 2d 94, 204 P. 2d 482 (1949).
99. The ambiguity of the record caused extreme difficulty of this kind
in Ex parte Fritz. 179 Cal. 415, 177 Pac. 157 (1918) (limiting earlier cases
allowing credit) ; People ex rel. Boyle v. Ragen, 400 Ill. 571, 81 N. E. 2d 444,
cert. denied, 335 U. S. 868 (1948) (denying credit) ; Travis v. Hunter, 109
Iowva 602, 80 N. W. 680 (1899) (relying on presumption of regularity) ;
State v. Stroemple, 355 Mo. 1147, 199 S. W. 2d 913 (1947) (rejecting claim
of double jeopardy) ; McCormick v. State, 71 Neb. 505, 99 N. W. 237
(1904) (rejecting claim of double jeopardy) ; Ex parte Wilkerson, 76 Okla.

Crim. 204, 135 P. 2d 507 (1943) (at retrial, jury had apparently allowed
credit; on appeal [apparently to prevent double credit] overruled EX parte
Williams, 63 Okla. Crim. 395, 75 P. 2d 904 (1938), which had held credit
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Furthermore, some clarification may be needed to indicate the
effect of the deduction upon parole eligibility, good conduct, credits,
work credits, and other deductions. This is especially so when the
deduction is made by the prison authority or sentence board. It
has been accomplished in three ways:
(1) by stating that the credit for time served on subsequently
vacated sentences is in addition to other credits and deductions ;100

(2) by giving the credit for time served priority over other
credits and deductions ;101
(3) by making the resentence nunc pro tunc, as of the date of
the vacated sentence, for all purposes. 0 2
The desirable approach depends upon the local penal system
entirely. The third method-the nunc pro tunc sentence-has admirable simplicity, involving least disruption of existing ideas and
habits in most jurisdictions. 02
IV. CONCLUSION
Consequently it appears that the practice of denying credit for
time served under a sentence subsequently vacated is unjust and
inequitable. It trenches upon the equal protection guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is a departure from even-handed justice. It is an unnecessary irrational feature of the criminal system
of the jurisdictions which have espoused it.
Legislative correction is necessary and desirable. But unless
must be allowed) ; Ogle v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 219, 63 S. W. 1009 (1901)
(jury had apparently given credit) ; State v. Lindsey, 194 Wash. 129, 77 P.
2d 596 (1938) (sentencing judge had apparently allowed credit).
100. N. Y. Pen. Law § 2193 (". . . in addition to the discretionary reduction allowed under the provisions of the correction law... .') ; Va. Code
").
Ann. § 53-208 (1950) (". . . in addition to the good conduct allowance..
101. Puerto Rico Laws 1946, # 293, § 6: "The deductions mentioned in
this Act shall be made by the proper penal authorities with preference over
any other reductions or deductions authorized by other laws, except where
it is otherwise provided in said laws."
102. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 894 (Supp. 1949): " . . shall begin to
run and be computed from the date of commitment ... ." And see also Lindsey v. Superior Court of King County, 33 Wash. 2d 94; 104, 204 P. 2d 482,
487 (1947) : ". . . by having the judgment state the time from which the
sentence and imprisonment thereunder shall run."
103. Of course a provision like 36 Stat. 1157 (1911), as amended, 18
U. S. C. § 3568 (Supp. 1949), construed literally, may interfere with the
nunc pro tunc resentence:
"The sentence of imprisonment of any person ... shall commence to run
from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of said sentence.
"If any such person shall be committed to a jail or other place of detention to await transportation . . ., his sentence shall commence to run from
the date on which he is received at such jail or other place of detention.
"No sentence shall prescribe any other method of computing the term."
See Byers v. United States, 175 F. 2d 654, 656 (10th Cir. 1949).
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such correction accomplishes certain things, it will defeat its purpose. The amendatory statute must, consistently with the rest of
the jurisdiction's criminal procedure and penal system, provide
for the following:
1. Mandatory credit for time served under a subsequently
vacated sentence;
2. Designation of the agency to allow the credit;
3. Prescription of the manner in which the allowance of the
credit is to be placed upon the record, and the prisoner informed of it;

4. Clarification of the relationship of the credit for such time
served to other deductions permitted for different purposes.
The selection of the specific approach to be used in a given
jurisdiction must depend, as has been indicated, upon the peculiarities of the local system. Adequate materials are available among
the statutes which have been employed. The need for action is
urgent, lest an anachronistic dogma continue the perversion of
justice.

